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Abstract—The ability of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to accurately process real-time telemetry has boosted
their use in safety-critical and high-performance computing systems. As such systems require high levels of resilience to errors, CNNs must
execute correctly in the presence of hardware faults. Full duplication provides the needed assurance but incurs a prohibitive 100% overhead.
Algorithmic techniques are known to offer low-cost solutions, but the practical feasibility and performance of such techniques have never
been studied for CNN deployment platforms (e.g., TensorFlow or TensorRT on GPUs). In this paper, we focus on algorithmically verifying
Convolutions, which are the most resource-demanding operations in CNNs. We use checksums to verify convolutions, adding a small
amount of redundancy, far less than full-duplication. We first identify the challenges that arise in employing Algorithm-Based Error Detection
(ABED) for Convolutions in optimized inference platforms that fuse multiple network layers and use reduced-precision operations, and
demonstrate how to overcome them. We propose and evaluate variations of ABED techniques that offer implementation complexity, runtime
overhead, and coverage trade-offs. Results show that ABED can detect all transient hardware errors that might otherwise corrupt output
and does so while incurring low runtime overheads (6-23%), offering at least 1.6× throughput to workloads compared to full duplication.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Following recent improvement in the ability of
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) to perform
complex tasks with high efficiency and accuracy, CNNs have
made their way into safety-critical and High Performance
Computing (HPC) systems. For example, autonomous vehicles
(AVs) employ CNNs to perform complex tasks such as vehicle,
cyclist, pedestrian, lane, road-sign, and free-space detection [4],
[38]. HPC systems also employ CNNs for object classification
and detection, image segmentation, and video analytics for
application domains such as healthcare, climate analysis, and
surveillance, and often in real-time settings [22], [33]. As the
compute throughput and power efficiency demands of the
CNN-based safety-critical and HPC systems are high, efficient
platforms are being designed to meet the throughput demands
within limited power budgets [26], [45]. For example, the
recently released NVIDIA DRIVE AGX Xavier System-on-Chip
and T4 GPU deliver up to 32 and 130 TOPS while consuming
just 30 and 70 watts of power, respectively [33], [38].
Safety-critical and HPC systems must be designed to tolerate
hardware errors such as those originating from hardware
transient, intermittent, and permanent faults. Some market
segments require systems to meet strict safety standards,
such as the ISO 26262 functional safety standard for AVs [18].
This standard requires the system to be robust to single-point
transient, intermittent, and permanent faults either by design
or by coverage from safety procedures (such as ECC and
parity). The level of robustness a hardware component desires
to obtain is determined by the Automotive Safety Integrity
Level (ASIL). For ASIL D (the highest safety level), the system
is required to be robust to ≥99% of faults; the requirements for
ASIL C and B are 97% and 90%, respectively [30]. The rate of
residual failures, measured in Failure In Time or FITs (where
1 FIT refers to 1 failure per billion hours), must also be ≤100
and ≤10 FIT for ASIL B/C and D, respectively. While the
HPC market also demands high resilience, the requirements
are not as rigorous as those of ISO 26262 [44].
With the increasing prevalence of CNNs in safety-critical
and HPC systems and the resilience requirements of such
systems, correctness of CNNs must be assured in the presence
of hardware faults for safety and standards-compliance. Prior
studies have analyzed the effects of hardware errors on
CNN outputs and observed noticeable corruptions that must
be mitigated to ensure safe operation [23], [40]. Processors
deployed in such systems employ ECC and/or parity in major
SRAM structures. This protection is typically not sufficient to
meet the requirements of ASIL B, C, or D for all the hardware
error sources. Aggressive employment of ECC/parity on flip-
flops and small SRAM buffers comes at an area cost and may
still be insufficient for all error sources due to the error rate
contribution from non-storage elements. For intermittent and
permanent faults, non-storage elements contribute significantly
towards the total error rates in GPUs and DNN-accelerators
that dedicate significant chip area to logic [9]. Full hardware
redundancy can provide the needed safety [2], [19], [46], but
it reduces the throughput by 2× or more, which is prohibitive
for resource-constrained systems. The goal of this paper is to
develop a low-cost CNN-specific resilience solution that allows
the full system to meet the target markets’ requirements, while
incurring far lower overheads compared to full duplication.
Over 90% of the computation during CNN inference and
training is in convolutions [24]. Algorithmic methods have
been devised to speed up the convolution operation. These
methods include using General Matrix Multiplication (GEMM),
Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT), and Winograd [45]. Fault
tolerance approaches that leverage algorithm knowledge,
known as algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT), have been
shown to provide lower overheads for GEMM and FFT than
full duplication algorithms [15], [17]. These techniques leverage
the fact that these operations are linear and verify the cor-
rectness using a checksum-based approach. These techniques
compute checksums for input data, store them with the original
data, perform the original and redundant computation, verify
ar
X
iv
:2
00
6.
04
98
4v
1 
 [c
s.D
C]
  8
 Ju
n 2
02
0
2outputs, and possibly correct errors. The number of extra
compute operations they introduce is a small fraction of the
original computation. While prior ABFT implementations
have achieved runtime overheads of about 20% for square
matrices [13], our analysis shows that the overheads can
be much higher (>50%) for the non-square matrices that
are typically used in CNNs. The main sources of overheads
include running the larger GEMM, managing storage to store
checksums and associated data movement (especially if they
are stored with the input data), and computing the checksums
online for the input and output matrices.
While ABFT techniques aim to correct errors inline along
with detection, the correction capability is limited (e.g., only a
single cell error in a row or column can be corrected) and there
is no evidence that it is sufficient for real hardware errors. More-
over, detecting an error to prevent silent data corruption (SDC)
is more important to safety-critical and HPC systems than the
ability to correct it inline. Upon error detection, a low-cost
local recovery mechanism can be invoked that either restores
the system state [8] or reruns the operation on the same or a
spare resource. For rare locally-unrecoverable errors, a heavy-
weight fallback mechanism can be invoked (e.g., transition to a
degraded mode of operation [39]) to handle the detected error.
Based on this observation, we focus on algorithm-based
error detection (ABED) techniques in this paper and avoid
additional costs associated with inline error tolerance.
Since convolution is also a linear operation, like GEMM,
and a similar checksum-based solution can be applied
at the convolution level. A recent study explored using
such a solution to detect errors in CNN accelerators (via
hardware modifications) with the goal of overclocking the
system [28] and detecting corruptions online. It proposed
using checksums for filters and input feature maps (two inputs
to the convolution) to verify the checksum of the output.
CNN inference deployment platforms (e.g., TensorRT, Ten-
sorFlow, PyTorch) are commonly used in safety-critical and
HPC systems [33], [38]. Employing an algorithmic resilience
technique in such platforms for seamless application across
architectures (e.g., CPUs, GPUs, or accelerators) is desirable.
However, several feasibility-, performance-, and coverage-
related challenges remain. (1) The increasing use of reduced-
precision data types (e.g., 8 and 4-bit integers) in CNNs
introduces new challenges for checksum-based error detection
techniques. For example, the checksum calculations can over-
flow without careful design. (2) Convolution, a linear operation,
is often fused with subsequent activation layers, which are
non-linear operations, to reduce data movement and improve
performance [33]. Checksum-based techniques do not not
apply to the non-linear computations and separating the linear
and non-linear computations into different operations can
incur high overheads, introducing additional design challenge.
We address overflow in checksum calculation and storage
such that no information is lost, and full error detection
capability is maintained. We also present implementation
options that enable ABED techniques to function with the
fused (linear and non-linear) layers. We not only addressed
the above two challenges for the previously proposed ABED
algorithm that employed checksums for both filter and input
feature map checksums [28], but also proposed and analyzed
two other variations that use checksums just for filters
and input feature maps, respectively. We leverage domain
knowledge of CNNs to simplify memory management to
store checksums and reduce the number of online tasks.
We study the implementation complexity, runtime over-
head, and resilience related trade-offs offered by the three
ABED techniques. For architecture that protect the memory
subsystem well with ECC/parity, a filter-only checksum-based
ABED technique offers a lower-overhead solution when used
with commonly-used CNN pruning optimization [16], [29].
The filter and input feature map checksum-based technique
provides high coverage for architectures that do not sufficiently
protect memory subsystem with low overheads even when de-
ployed without CNN pruning optimization. Our results show
that ABED can eliminate all transient-error-induced convolu-
tion output corruptions with low (6-23%) runtime overhead
on state-of-the-art GPUs, offering at least 1.6× throughput
improvements to workloads compared to full duplication.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Related Work
Full Hardware/Software Redundancy: Traditional business-
class systems (e.g., IBM Z Series machines [5]) employ expen-
sive hardware-managed dual- or triple-modular redundancy
schemes. In safety-critical systems, similar techniques are
being employed to meet the highest-levels of safety integrity
requirements [2], [19], [46]. Software techniques have been
explored that introduce redundancy at different granularities
including the process, GPU kernel, thread, and assembly
instruction level [12], [27], [47], but they all incur overheads
that are high for resource-limited real-time systems.
Algorithm-Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT): ABFT techniques
leverage algorithmic knowledge to detect and correct errors
with very low overheads and they have been heavily studied
in literature for GEMM and FFT [13], [15], [17], [25]. For
GEMM, these approaches introduce row checksums for one
of the matrices and column checksums for the other. When
the matrix multiplication operation is performed with the
checksums, an output matrix is produced with an extra row
and column. Each of these extra values are expected to match
the checksums of the rows and columns of the output matrix.
In an event of an error, these techniques can localize the error
and use redundant information to correct certain types of
errors. Several algorithmic techniques have been proposed
to increase the capability of correcting output matrix cell
corruptions with little emphasis on studying how low-level
hardware faults manifest at that level [7], [48]. Hence it is
unclear whether the benefits of the additional correction
capability outweigh the costs of higher overhead.
A recent study showed that protecting GEMMs in CNNs
via ABFT can provide high protection [10]. While no runtime
overhead analysis was included, the paper acknowledged that
GEMM kernels are tuned to fully use caches and registers, and
adding an extra dimension for checksum storage would not
only compromise execution time, but also significantly increase
data movement and memory latency. Our experiments confirm
this hypothesis and show that the ABFT’s overheads for non-
square matrices commonly used in CNNs is high (>50%).
Our results show that ABFT’s error correction capabilities
often introduce higher overheads. A related study suggests
that error detection and re-computation can be cheaper
than checksum-based ABFT techniques [1]. Moreover, the
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Fig. 1. A typical convolution operation used by most CNNs.
effectiveness of the ABFT’s correction capability is not
established for real hardware errors because they may not
manifest as correctable (single-cell output) corruptions.
Based on a similar observations, researchers proposed
using a checksum-based ABED technique [28] to detect errors
during a convolution. Since convolution is a linear operation
like GEMM, a checksum-based error detection technique
can be extended to it as well. This work used checksums for
both the filters and input feature maps to verify the output.
The goal of the paper was to overclock a CNN accelerator
and detect incorrectly computed convolutions. It extended
the hardware accelerator to include the detection technique.
Several challenges arise while applying ABED to convolutions
in optimized CNN inference platforms (e.g., TensorRT,
TensorFlow, PyTorch) commonly used in safety-critical and
HPC systems. (1) The use of reduced precision operations
is common during inference and without proper care, the
checksum arithmetic can overflow. (2) A convolution operation
is often fused with a non-linear activation layer, to reduce data
movement and improve performance [33]. Checksum-based
techniques apply only to the linear operations. Separating the
linear and non-linear computations into different operations
can incur high overheads due to additional data movement,
introducing additional implementation challenge. (3) Without
customizing ABED to the CNN inference frameworks, online
checksum storage management and generation for the output
and both the inputs on every convolution introduces avoidable
runtime overheads (explained further in Sections 5.3 and 6.3).
We not only address these challenges in this paper, but also
identified and explored two other ABED variants (not previ-
ously studied) that use checksums either for filters or input
feature maps (explained in Section 3). These variants offer inter-
esting error coverage and performance trade-offs, important in
selecting an optimal solution for a target safety-critical system.
2.2 The Convolution Operation
A convolution operation takes two input tensors and produces
one output tensor. One of the input tensors is for the input
feature maps (or fmaps); these fmaps are either the output of
the previous layer or the input to the network. Input fmaps are
represented as a 4-D tensor in most CNNs. Each feature map
is a 2-D tensor with height (H) and width (W). Typically, many
feature maps are stacked to form a 3-D tensor. The number of
channels (C) defines the number of feature maps in the stack.
Many 3-D input fmaps are batched (batch size = N) together
to form the 4-D feature map tensor. The other input tensor is
the set of filters, which consists of weights that are computed
during the training process. Each filter is a 3-D tensor of
weights with dimensions height (S), width (R), and channels
(C). Each convolution layer has multiple filters (number of
filters = K), adding an extra dimension to produce a 4-D tensor.
Each output feature map value is produced by performing
a dot-product between a filter and a same-sized portion of the
input fmap’s tensor. An example is shown in the highlighted
cells in Figure 1, along with the formula to compute each of
the output fmap values. As one filter produces one output
feature map, the number of channels (feature maps) in the
output is the same as the number of filters (K). The number
of output fmaps is the same as the batch size (N).
3 CONVOLUTION ABED APPROACH
Verifying every output value of a convolution might require
duplicating the entire operation. Instead, the focus of this
work is on verifying just the reduced output, i.e., sum of all the
output elements. This reduced output can be computed from
the inputs directly with far fewer computations. We essentially
use a different sequence of sums and products. Since integer
sum and product operations are commutative and associative,
changing the order of the operations is not a concern. Based
on this key insight, we explore the following three schemes
to verify a convolution, which are summarized in Figure 2.
3.1 Filter Checksum-Based (FC)
In this scheme, a 3-D filter checksum tensor is computed by
performing an element-wise sum (using sum as a checksum
function) across all the 3-D filter tensors ( 1 in Figure 2(a)).
This new checksum filter is convolved with the input fmaps
to compute an extra output fmap, which is used to verify the
original fmaps’ values. The original output fmaps’ values are
reduced across the channel dimension to generate a reduced
fmap, which is compared element-wise for equality with
the extra output fmap for verification ( 3 in Figure 2(a)).
This method protects the computation involved in the
convolution, the data storage and transportation of filters
(between DRAM/L2 and registers) and output fmaps, but not
the storage and transportation of input fmaps. This scheme
increases the number of operations in the convolution by a
factor of 1/K and introduces PQNK operations for output
verification. Here PQNK refers to P×Q×N×K. We omit the
multiplication symbols while referring to products of the
parameters of the convolution for brevity.
3.2 Input Checksum-Based (IC)
This scheme uses checksums of input fmaps, which can be
computed in one of two ways: (1) summing input fmaps’
values element-wise across batches to add a new checksum
batch, and (2) summing elements of the portions of the input
fmaps that are used to perform the dot-product with the filters
during the convolution operation to produce a tensor that
is the same size as the filter.
The first option effectively increases the batch size by one.
The original output fmaps’ values are reduced across all
the original batches to generate a batch of checksum output
fmaps, which is compared for element-wise equality with the
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Fig. 2. A depiction of the filter-only (FC), input fmap-only (IC), and filter and input fmap (FIC) checksum-based error detection schemes. Formulae
to generate the checksums and verify output fmap values are also shown.
extra batch of output fmaps generated using the checksum
input fmaps for verification. This option is attractive if the
batch size is large because the effective overhead of running
the larger convolution would be small. However, for small
batch sizes, which is common in safety-critical systems [33],
[42], this option can result in high overheads.
The second option reduces the input fmaps into a separate
checksum tensor, which is the same size as a filter for the layer
( 1 in Figure 2(b)). This checksum tensor is then convolved
with K filters to produce exactly K values. The output fmaps
are reduced across height, width, and batch dimensions and
then compared with these K values element-wise for equality
for verification ( 4 and 5 in Figure 2(b)). This method
protects the computation involved in the convolution, the data
storage and transportation of input and output fmaps, but not
the storage and transportation of the filters. The number of
additional computations needed for the convolution is CRSK,
input fmap checksum generation is PQNCRS, and output
fmap checksum generation for verification is PQNK.
3.3 Filter and Input Fmap Checksum-Based (FIC)
The scheme, similar to the one proposed by prior work [28],
creates checksums for both the filter and input fmaps ( 1
and 2 in Figure 2(c)). Using the two checksums, we perform
an extra convolution ( 3 in Figure 2(c)). This operation can
also be implemented as a vector-vector dot-product because
the filter checksum size is same as the input fmap checksum
size. This operation produces a single value, which is used
to verify the original computation. The original convolution
is run with the original parameters and the output is reduced
to a single value, which is verified using the value generated
by the dot-product. ( 4 , 5 , and 6 in Figure 2(c)). This
method protects the computation involved in the convolution
and the data storage as well as the transportation of filters
and the input and output fmaps. The number of additional
computations needed for dot-product is CRS, input fmap
checksum generation is PQNCRS, and output fmap checksum
generation for verification is PQNK.
3.4 Trade-offs
Table 1 summarizes the trade-offs offered by the FC, IC, and
FIC techniques in terms of the number of tasks that must be
performed online and the protection they provide. The table
shows that FIC offers better protection than FC and IC by
protecting the storage and data movement of both the filters
and inputs. The filter checksums can be generated offline
because the weights are known before a CNN is deployed.
However, the input and output checksum generation and
verification tasks must be performed online. Since the online
tasks needed for the FIC and IC techniques are similar, the
runtime overheads also expected to be similar. Given that FIC
offers superior protection compared to IC but the runtimes
are expected to be similar, we do not investigate IC further.
Since FC must run a larger convolution, the overhead can be
higher than FIC. However, FC can be faster if the larger convo-
lution adds minimal overheads, which is possible with the use
of network pruning techniques [16], [29]. Network pruning
improves network performance by identifying and removing
filters that contribute minimally to the accuracy of the network.
With the use of pruned networks, the number of filters per layer
may diminish so that adding the checksum filter introduces
minimal overheads (explored further in Section 6).
4 IMPLEMENTATION
This section addresses challenges that arise while implement-
ing ABED on a GPU-based system. Specifically, we explain
(1) how to maintain high coverage by avoiding overflow
while using reduced-precision operations and storage, the use
of which is prevalent in inference platforms, (2) task-fusion
based optimizations/modifications we propose to the highly-
optimized inference platforms to minimize the overheads intro-
duced by ABED, and (3) modifications needed to the inference
deployment frameworks for seamless integration with ABED.
5TABLE 1
Trade-offs between the FC, IC, and the FIC techniques. Entries marked
Yes/Offline and No/Online are favorable and unfavorable, respectively.
Criteria FC IC FIC
A
dd
iti
on
al
W
or
k
Filter checksum generation Offline - Offline
Input fmap checksum
generation - Online Online
Avoid running a larger
convolution No Yes Yes
Pr
ot
ec
ts Computation Yes Yes Yes
Storage and
transportation
Filters Yes No Yes
Input
fmaps No Yes Yes
4.1 Handling Reduced-Precision Operations
The use of reduced-precision fixed-point data types has
been explored both in research as well as many commercial
products. For example, 8-bit integer arithmetic is supported in
Google’s Tensor Processing Unit, NVIDIA’s Volta and Turing
GPUs, Intel Xeon Scalable Processors, and ARM CPUs [3], [21],
[32], [41]. Fixed-point arithmetic suffers from overflow if the
result does not have sufficient bits to represent the full value.
Here we describe a method to ensure full error coverage while
using reduced-precision fixed-point data types.
Convolutions that use 8-bit integers (int8) store the filters
and input fmaps using int8 data types. Each output fmap value
is obtained by performing a dot-product using one filter (of size
CRS) with a same sized portion of the input fmap, illustrated
by the highlighted portion in Figure 1. In this operation, CRS
16-bit values, each of which is a product of two int8 values, are
summed together. Making no assumption about the values, the
result can be accurately represented using [16+log2(CRS)]-
bit integers. For most practical values of C, R, and S (CRS≤
64K), int32 is sufficient to avoid overflow during convolutions.
We use two’s complement integer summation as the
checksum function. To avoid overflow during checksum
generation, we use int32 operations. For the FC technique,
we store the int32 checksums as a tuple consisting of up to
four int8 values, creating up to four checksum filters. No
information is lost with this scheme. The extra output fmap
values are shifted left by 1, 8, 16, and 24, respectively, and
added together across the channel dimension. These values are
then compared with the output fmap checksums, which are
obtained by summing the original output fmap values across
the channel dimension (K additions). The reduced result can be
accurately represented using [16+log2(CRSK)]-bit integers.
For most practical values of C, R, S, and K, 64-bits are sufficient.
For the FIC technique, the filter checksum is obtained by
summing K int8 filters and can be accurately represented by
[8+log2(K)]-bit integers. Each input fmap checksum value is
computed by summing PQN int8 input fmap values, requiring
up to [8+log2(PQN)] bits. The result of the convolution of
the checksums would require up to [16+log2(PQNKCRS)]
bits. For most practical purposes, int32 and int64 are sufficient
to store the checksums and convolution results, respectively.
Table 2 summarizes the maximum number of bits needed
to accurately represent the values at different points during
the convolution operation for the FC and FIC techniques
based on worst-case overflow analysis. We assume unsigned
integers for this analysis. The requirements can be slightly
less for signed integers. For example, the result of multiplying
TABLE 2
The bit requirements to accurately represent the results while verifying intb
(e.g., int8 for b=8) convolutions.
FIC FC
Input fmaps b b
Input fmap checksum b+log2(K) -
Filters b b
Filter checksum b+log2(PQN) b
Output fmap 2×b+log2(CRS) 2×b+log2(CRS)
Reduced output fmap 2×b+log2(PQNKCRS) 2×b+log2(CRSK)
Dot-product output 2×b+log2(PQNKCRS) -
two signed 8-bit integers (with 1 sign bit) can be accurately
represented using 15-bit signed integers (with 1 sign bit).
Since all parameters are known prior to a neural network
deployment, the ABED precision requirements can also
be determined. For the networks used in this paper, int64
checksums are sufficient to avoid overflow. If the precision
requirements increase beyond int64, modular arithmetic can
be used to limit the highest precision operation used by the
verification kernel (to reduce runtime overhead) with some
loss in coverage, which we do not explore in this paper.
Floating-point arithmetic suffers from both overflow
and rounding. While we explored ways to address these
issues, the discussion to maintain high error coverage
using floating-point data types is deferred to Section 7, as
commercial implementations increasingly use fixed-point
arithmetic due to its performance and energy advantages.
4.2 Framework Modifications
Once a neural network is trained, it is optimized and pre-
pared for deployment using a platform for high-performance
inference (e.g., TensorRT). The optimizations involve pruning,
weight and activation precision calibration (also known as
quantization), layer and tensor fusion, and kernel auto-tuning.
These optimizations are typically performed once to create an
inference engine, which is then serialized to avoid preparation
overheads. We perform the following during the optimization
step. (1) We create checksum filters and store them along with
the filter tensor and in separate storage for the FC and FIC
techniques, respectively. (2) We introduce all the additional
online tasks that should be executed during inference as part
of the ABED scheme (e.g., input and output checksum genera-
tion). Figure 3 summarizes the proposed changes for seamless
integration of ABED in a tool-chain used to deploy trained
models for inference. ABED is independent from all optimiza-
tion described above, except the layer and kernel fusion. We
next describe how ABED can be applied to highly-optimized
convolutions that are fused with subsequent layers in CNNs.
4.3 Kernel Modifications
As described in Section 2, common convolution operations
take two 4-D tensors as inputs, one each for input fmaps and
filters (I and F) and produce a 4-D tensor of output fmaps
(O). Convolution, bias, and activation operations are typically
fused together for performance. Such fused operations perform
O=activation(conv(x)+bias). For int8 convolutions, I and
F use int8, and O uses either int8 or fp32. Figure 4 explains
the logical flow of computation within such fused kernels.
For int8 convolutions, the output of the convolution operation
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Fig. 3. Inference deployment steps and where ABED can be included for
seamless integration.
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is an int32 result (ConvOut in the figure). This intermediate
result is then scaled using a scaling factor that is generated
during the calibration step, which produces an fp32 result
(ScaledOut in the figure). This step assumes that the scaled
int32 result can be accurately represented using an fp32 data
type. Bias is added to ScaledOut. The activation function is
then applied to it to produce ActOut (another fp32 value). If
this value (ActOut) is too large to be accurately represented
using int8 data type, it will be clamped and truncated to
produce an int8 output value. We refer to all the operations
after the convolution operation as epilog.
The ABED techniques verify just the result of the
convolution. Hence, the intermediate output (ConvOut in
Figure 4) must be verified before the epilog is applied, which
can be performed by either using un-fused kernels or fusing
some part of the output fmap checksum generation task with
the fused convolution + epilog kernel. Figure 5 lists some of
the options for the FIC technique. For each option (one row
in the table), we list the tasks that must be performed (in
columns) and show the unfused/fused kernels that the option
will execute. For each of the kernels, we show the data types
and sizes of its inputs and outputs.
FIC Technique: The following seven tasks (one more than
what is listed in Figure 2(c)) must be performed for the
FIC technique to detect errors in the fused convolution +
epilog kernel: (1) filter checksum generation, (2) input fmap
checksum generation (ICG), (3) dot-product of the filter and
input fmap checksums, (4) convolution operation, (5) output
fmap checksum generation (OCG), (6) epilog, and (7) verifying
the output fmap checksum with the output of step (3). The first
task is performed offline, as described above. All other tasks
are performed online. Since task (7) involves comparing just
two values for bit-wise equality, it can be performed on the
host CPU. There are several ways to perform the remaining
online tasks on a GPU. A simple option is to use different GPU
kernels to perform each of the tasks, shown as option Unfused
in Figure 5. The input checksum generation kernel reads the
input fmaps in int8 data type of size NHCW and generates
an int32 checksum vector of size CRS. The convolution kernel
reads in the int8 filters and input fmaps of sizes KCRS and
NCHW, respectively, and writes out an int32 output of size
NKPQ (ConvOut in Figure 4). The next kernel reads ConvOut
and applies epilog to produce an int8 output of the same size
as the input. The output fmap checksum generation kernel
reads the convolution output again to generate a single int64
checksum value. Lastly, the dot-product kernel reads in filter
and input fmap checksums, and two int32 vectors of sizes CRS.
It produces a single int64 value, which is compared with the
output fmap checksum for equality. This implementation does
not protect the epilog output and introduces several additional
data transfers including the convolution output stored in int32
data type (4× the size of an equivalent int8 structure).
Task fusion can significantly reduce data movement. While
we explored multiple options to (partially/fully) fuse tasks, we
describe only two options here for brevity. (1) The convolution,
epilog, and output fmap checksum generation kernels can be
fused into a single kernel to limit data movement introduced
by ABED (FusedOCG in Figure 5). It generates a int64 value
for output fmap checksum along with the output of the fused
convolution + epilog tasks, i.e., int8 output fmap tensor of
size NKPQ. (2) To further reduce data movement and provide
coverage for epilog’s output, the output checksum generation
task can be modified to produce the input fmap checksum for
the subsequent layer, if the next layer is a convolution layer
(FusedIOCG in Figure 5). It essentially fuses input checksum
generation task with the fused convolution + epilog + output
checksum generation kernel. This optimization duplicates the
epilog, but we assume that data movement saving will improve
runtime more than the overhead introduced by duplicating
compute-bound epilog. The FusedOCG and FusedIOCG op-
tions require changes to the existing fused convolution + epilog
kernel offered by frameworks such as cuDNN and TensorRT.
FC Technique: The following are the tasks needed for the FC
technique (one more than what is listed in Figure 2(a)): (1) filter
checksum generation, (2) convolution operation, (3) epilog,
and (4) output fmap reduction and verification. The first task
is done offline. The verification task involves computing check-
sums from the original and extra output feature maps across
the channel dimension separately and comparing them for bit-
wise equality. This task must be performed before the epilog
and can be implemented in multiple ways. The first option is
to not fuse the operations and launch separate kernels for the
convolution, epilog, and output fmap checksum generation
and verification. This option is similar to Unfused for FIC. Fus-
ing the output fmap checksum generation and verification task
with the already fused convolution + epilog kernel will reduce
data movement. This option is similar to FusedOCG for FIC.
Since this technique adds checksum filters, the runtime
of the larger convolution can be higher. The increase can be
super-linear in the number of filters for certain architectures
and convolution parameters. The convolution implementation
is often tiled. The runtime may not increase if a tile boundary
is not crossed and can increase significantly if it is crossed.
Coordination with the pruning techniques may help in
reducing this overhead. When the network is being prepared
for deployment, filter-pruning is commonly employed to
optimize the network’s performance and storage [16], [29].
Reducing the number of filters at this step such that the
checksum filters can be included without introducing a new
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Fig. 5. Implementation options for the FIC technique are shown. Each colored box represents a GPU kernel and shows the data type and size of
the inputs and outputs. Inputs/outputs for which the data transportation is not protected are shown in red.
tile of work can reduce the overhead significantly.
The output of the fused operation must be trimmed such
that the extra feature maps are ignored by the subsequent
layer. Trimming can be fused with the output verification task.
We do not explicitly study the effects of trimming because
implementing it simply requires skipping some writes.
5 EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
We evaluate the overheads introduced by the ABED techniques
to the convolutional layers from different CNNs. We use
VGG16, ResNet18, and ResNet50 for analysis [14], [43]. We
evaluate using two different image sizes—224x224, the size
of the images in the ImageNet dataset [11], and 1080x1920,
the resolution of the images in a full-HD or 1080p video.
5.1 Compute/Data Movement Overheads Estimation
We first analytically evaluate the increase in the compute
and data movement operations when we apply the FC and
FIC ABED techniques to the networks. In this analysis, we
abstract away implementation details and only consider
the arithmetic operations such as multiplication, addition,
fused multiply-addition (FMA), activation, and type-casting.
Similarly, we also count the bytes of data that form the inputs
and outputs of different implementations for the FC and FIC
techniques, as listed in Section 4.3.
5.2 Runtime Overhead Evaluation
We experimentally evaluate the runtime of convolutions by
creating a cuDNN-based workload that sets up, initializes,
and runs convolutions in a loop. We compile this workload
using CUDA 10 and use cuDNN 7.3 [37] on both a Jetson AGX
Xavier system and an x86-based desktop with a V100-based
GPU (Titan V) [32], [34]. For performance analysis, we lock
the CPU, GPU, and memory clocks on the Jetson board and
lock the application clocks on the V100 GPU. We run the
convolution (and other operations needed by the ABED
techniques) 200 times, recording the average. Since real-time
applications (including safety-critical systems) use small
batch sizes, we use batch size of two on Jetson and eight
on V100-based system [33], [42]. We ignore the first layer in
each network because it is not well optimized by cuDNN. We
use NHWC memory layout to tensor storage, as int8 cuDNN
convolutions are optimized for this layout.
For a baseline, we invoke the fused convolution
and epilog kernel provided by cuDNN (called
cudnnConvolutionBiasActivationForward). We implement
versions that are similar to Unfused for the FIC and FC
techniques. As cuDNN does not offer a convolution kernel
that takes in two int8 tensors and produces an int32 tensor
as output, we employ a version that produces fp32 output.
The epilog, when performed separately, invokes two GPU
kernels (one each for adding bias and applying activation) and
generates a fp32 tensor as output (instead of an int8 tensor,
as mentioned in Section 4.3, due to cuDNN API limitations).
For analyzing the Unfused implementation options for ABED,
we also collect results with just the unfused convoltuion and
epilog kernels (without ABED). This version launches one
kernel each to perform the convolution operation, add bias,
and apply activation. We refer to it as the unfused baseline.
The checksum generation kernels are written in CUDA.
Since the checksum generation has similarities to the reduction
operation, we use previously-established optimizations.
Specifically, we use the functions and primitives (such as
DeviceReduce and WarpReduce) provided by the CUB library
optimized implementations [35]. We try to minimize the use of
atomics and leverage faster memory (e.g., registers and shared
memory) as much as possible. We ensure that global loads
are coalesced across warps and use wide loads per thread
(e.g., LD.128). We avoid control flow and use the dot-product
instruction (DP4A) whenever possible to avoid a compute
bottleneck [36]. We specialize kernels for filter sizes 1 and
3, strides 1 and 2, and for data types int8 and int32. For the
FC technique, we add 8 filters (4 for checksums and 4 with
zeros for int8) because the cuDNN version we use on our
target device chooses efficient kernels when the number of
filters is a multiple of 8. We obtain the aggregate runtimes per
network by adding all of the GPU kernel runtimes and show
the runtime relative to one of the baselines mentioned above.
Effect of Task Fusion-based Optimization: Since we could
not modify the closed-source cuDNN kernels to fuse checksum
generation and output verification tasks with the convolution
for the FusedOCG versions, we model the runtimes. We write
separate CUDA kernels to capture the overheads associated
with performing the additional work that will be fused with the
convolution + epilog kernel. For FIC-FusedOCG, the new ker-
nel fully reduces the output and writes out just one int64 value.
Since using atomic operations for reduction can be a perfor-
mance bottleneck, we hierarchically reduce the output similar
8to the prior optimized reduction task implementations [35].
For FC-FusedOCG, the new kernel reduces the values across
the channel dimension for verification and sets a flag on an
error detection. We measure the runtimes of these kernels by
running them on silicon and add the runtimes to Baseline-
Fused as an estimate of Kernel 3’s runtime (from Figure 5).
5.3 Overhead Analysis of a Traditional ABFT Technique
As convolutions can be implemented using GEMM, ABFT can
be employed at the GEMM-level to provide protection. While
prior work explained the resilience benefits, no performance
assessment was included [10]. We quantify the overheads
associated with the ABFT technique for GEMM and highlight
the benefits of our ABED solutions to protect convolutions.
An ABFT approach performs the following tasks: (1) allocate
larger input and output matrices with space for checksums,
(2) copy data from the original matrices to the new locations,
(3) generate checksums for both the input matrices, (4) run
the larger GEMM, instead of the original GEMM, (5) generate
both row and column checksums for the output (by reading
the output matrix twice) and compare them with the extra row
and column values generated by the GEMM, and (6) copy the
output matrix to the original location. We measure overheads
for tasks (2)-(6) by developing CUDA kernels. We compare the
runtime of our implementation of the checksum generation
task with the reduction operation provided by CUB [35] and
use that whenever it is faster (assuming checksum generation
can be as fast as reduction). ABFT can be implemented to
store the input checksums separately to avoid copying large
matrices. Such an implementation launches separate kernels
to perform original GEMM and generate extra output row and
column via vector-matrix products, which can be as slow as
the original GEMM for some matrix sizes (used in CNNs). Due
to such overheads, we do not explore this option in this paper.
5.4 Resilience Evaluation
We evaluate the resilience improvements offered by the
ABED techniques using three methods—analytical modeling,
input-output error injections, and accelerated-particle beam
experiments. The first method uses the same model used
above to analyze the increase in compute and data movement
operations. Here we analyze the fraction of compute and
data movement operations that are protected by the ABED
techniques. For the second method, we run the second convo-
lution layer from ResNet18 with input (fmap and filter) values
initialized to 1. We perform three error injection campaigns
to study the effect of injecting single bit-flips into input fmaps,
filters, and output fmaps. For each experiment in a campaign,
we randomly flip a bit in a randomly chosen location in the
tensor and study whether the ABED approach detects the error.
We conducted two accelerated-particle beam experiments
at ChipIr at Rutherford Appleton Laboratory and ICE-II at
LANSCE [6], [31] using our implementations of the Unfused
option for the FIC and FC techniques and baseline. We
excluded epilog in these experiments. The input tensors were
initialized to 1. After each convolution we verified the output
with the expected golden values that were collected during
fault-free runs. Any mismatch was recorded as an SDC. Our
investigation suggests that the output tensor was corrupted
for some runs after the ABED checks were completed, likely
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Fig. 6. The increase in the number of logical compute operations for the
two ABED techniques relative to the baselines.
when the output was being reduced to compare against
the golden checksum to determine the SDC. These output
corruptions are out of the coverage scope for ABED and
hence we do not consider them as SDCs in this study. We
also recorded whether our ABED scheme was able to detect
the error. We tested with NVIDIA Quadro GV100 GPUs with
HBM2 ECC always On, and on-chip ECC On and Off.
6 RESULTS
6.1 Compute/Data Movement Overheads Estimation
We first study the increase in the logical compute and data
movement operations based on the model described in
Section 5.1. Figure 6 shows a breakdown of the number
of arithmetic operations in convolution, epilog, checksum
generation, and dot-product of the checksums for the baseline
and the FC and FIC techniques. The average increase in the
number of operations is small, <7% for FC and <1% for
FIC for the studied networks compared to the respective
baselines. The increase is relatively higher for the FC technique
because it increases the size of the convolution, unlike the FIC
technique. Results show that the extra computations added
for checksum generation and performing the dot-product of
the checksums are significantly less than 1%.
Different implementations listed in Section 4.3 perform
the same logical compute tasks, but differ in terms of data
movement. Figure 7 shows the bytes of data that form the
inputs and outputs of the different implementation options
for ResNet18 using two input image sizes. Results for other
networks and input sizes show similar trends (not shown for
brevity). The figure shows that the fused versions transport
significantly less data compared to the versions that do
not fuse tasks. Introducing separate kernels for checksum
generation and verification introduces more data movement, as
is the case for FIC Unfused and FC Unfused. Results also show
that the FC FusedOCG requires less data movement than FIC
FusedOCG, but FIC FusedOCG offers better data movement
protection by using input and weight checksums, while FC
FusedOCG protects just the weight storage and movement.
6.2 Runtime Overheads
Figure 8 shows the average runtimes of the Unfused options of
the baseline and FC and FIC techniques. Results for the three
networks using 1080p inputs are shown here. The results are
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Fig. 7. The relative increase in the data that forms input and output of all the
kernels for different implementations of the ABED techniques is shown here.
normalized to the Fused baseline. The runtime overheads for
the FC technique stem from running a larger convolution with
additional checksum filters and output checksum generation.
For the FIC technique, the overheads stem from running the
input and output fmap checksum generation tasks and the
dot-product of the filter and input fmap checksums.
FC vs. FIC: Results show that the runtime overhead
introduced by the output checksum generation is similar
between the FC and FIC techniques. The dot-product kernel
used during the FIC technique introduces negligible overhead
across all the studied networks and architectures. The
difference in overheads between the FC and FIC techniques
is mainly due to running the larger convolution versus gen-
erating input fmap checksums online. The former introduces
higher overheads for all the networks and architectures
we studied (Figure 8). The results show that the overheads
introduced by the checksum generation and verification tasks
are small (4-20%). The overhead introduced by the separate
data-movement-heavy epilog is high which can be avoided
by the task-fusion-based implementations discussed below.
Model-specific Sensitivities: The overhead of output
checksum generation for ResNet50 is higher compared to
VGG16 and ResNet18. A primary reason for this difference
is that the overhead for verifying 1x1 convolutions is much
higher compared to verifying 3x3 convolutions, and ResNet50
uses many 1x1 convolutions while ResNet18 and VGG16 do
not use any. The fraction of the work (and data movement)
performed for checksum generation to that of the baseline
convolution is much higher for 1x1 convolutions compared to
3x3 convolution. Fusing the output checksum generation task
with the convolution operation can help reduce the overheads.
Architecture-specific Sensitivities: We show the results
obtained from Jetson AGX Xavier (with batch size of two)
and a V100-based GPU (with batch size of eight) in Figure 8.
The V100-based GPU offers approximately 10× compute
throughput and 5× memory bandwidth compared to the
Xavier GPU. As expected the baseline work is signficantly
faster on the V100-based GPU. Since the throughput to
bandwidth ratio is higher for the V100-based GPU, overheads
of the memory-bound tasks such as checksum generation and
epilog are higher. In fact, the tasks that are not memory-bound
in Xavier become memory bandwidth/latency limited in V100.
The runtime overhead of generating input checksums is
significantly lower than generating output checksums. The
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main contributing factor is that the input fmaps are 4×
smaller compared to the non-scaled 32-bit integer output fmap
values. One exception to this finding is ResNet-18 with image
size of 1080x1280 on the V100-based GPU. Input checksum
generation for ResNet-18 incurs high overhead because it
becomes memory-bandwidth limited on this GPU.
Input-specific Sensitivities: Figure 8 shows the relative
runtime for VGG16 with different input sizes (224x224 vs.
1088x1920). Since no significant difference is observed, we do
not analyze results with smaller image size for other networks.
Effect of Task Fusion-based Optimization: The runtime
overhead results for the FusedOCG optimization for FC and
FIC techniques obtained using the methodology described in
Section 5.2 are shown in Figure 9. These experiments were run
on Jetson Xavier. These results suggest that task fusion is highly
effective in reducing the overheads by reducing memory
traffic associated with epilog and additional ABED tasks. It
shows that the inference-level overheads for the FIC technique
(6-23%) are far lower than full duplication. The overheads
for the FC technique are higher mainly due to running the
larger convolution (with additional checksum filters).
Reducing overheads for the FC technique: In our FC imple-
mentations, we increase the filter counts by 8 (as described in
Section 5.2). The runtime of the convolution, however, increases
disproportionately for some layers. We illustrate this behavior
by executing a convolutional layer with a varying number of
filters. Specifically, we ran an int8 convolution with 112x112
input fmap, 3x3 filters, 64 input channels, and stride and
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padding of 1. We vary the filter counts and show that adding
just eight filters can introduce up to 2× overhead. Figure 10
shows these results. Since cuDNN uses GEMM as a method to
perform the int8 convolutions and GEMMs use tiling, the sharp
increase in the runtime is likely due to the use of an additional
tile. While such tiling effects are not a concern for GEMMs with
large dimensions, they can be problematic for the commonly
used convolutional layer dimensions (where K is small).
Instead of increasing the filter counts of the baseline network,
creating space for the filter checksums can eliminate this
overhead. As mentioned in Section 3.4, network pruning tech-
niques, which are being adapted as a way to improve network
performance, may create space for filter checksums. These tech-
niques identify and remove filters that contribute minimally to
the accuracy of the network. With the use of pruned networks,
the number of filters per layer may reduce even after adding
the checksum filter, the sharp increase in the convolution run-
time can be avoided. To test this hypothesis, we conducted an
experiment for the FC technique using VGG16 and two pruned
versions of the network. We obtain the number of pruned filters
per layer from a previously published result. Huang et al., stud-
ied two methods to prune the network [16]. The first approach
ranks filters on per layer basis, while the second ranks them
across all the network. Our results in Figure 11 demonstrate
that the overheads from running the larger convolution become
small, 2% or 10% for the two pruned versions, respectively,
compared to the 42% overhead for the non-pruned version.
6.3 Overhead Analysis of a Traditional ABFT Technique
As convolutions can be implemented using GEMM, ABFT for
GEMM (a well known technique) can provide high protection
to CNNs. A recent study explained the resilience benefits
of such an approach [10]. In this section, we quantify the
overheads associated with the ABFT technique for GEMM, as
described in Section 5.3, and highlight the benefits of our ABED
solutions to protect convolutions in CNNs. Results for the three
networks for 1080p input are shown in Figure 12. These results
show that running a larger GEMM incurs high overhead (sim-
ilar to the FC technique). This overhead can be reduced using
pruned networks (not explored here). As our ABFT implemen-
tation embeds the row and column checksums along with the
input matrices to perform a larger GEMM, online data man-
agement (i.e., copying input to larger matrices) introduces sig-
nificant overheads. This overhead can be avoided by allocating
larger matrices in the first place for the inputs and output with
broader application knowledge and framework support, which
is what we propose for the FC technique. The FIC technique
avoids running the larger convolution altogether, simplifying
data management. Lastly, processing output matrix twice to
generate both the row and column checksums for error correc-
tion capability can also introduce high overheads. Optimized
implementations that process the output just once will reduce
this overhead. By focusing on error detection alone, ABED sig-
nificantly speeds up this step by generating a single checksum.
6.4 Resilience Evaluation
Scope of protection: Figures 6 and 7 show the scope of
protection offered by different the FC and FIC techniques.
The ABED techniques protect computation in the convolution,
input and output checksum generation, and dot-product kernel.
Other than convolutions, CNNs include activation, pooling,
and fully-connected layers. Activation layers are typically
merged with the convolution layer and they constitute a small
fraction of the total compute (0.6% for ResNet18 and 1.1%
for ResNet50 as shown in Figure 6). Only a few pooling
layers are typically used in CNNs (just two in ResNet18 and
ResNet50, for example) and their compute requirement is
also small (<0.3%). Fully-connected layers can be converted to
GEMMs and checksum-based ABED techniques can be applied
for their protection. For full network protection, ABED can
be applied to convolutions and fully-connected layers, and
duplication can be used to protect the rest, which constitutes a
small fraction of the total compute, <1.4% for ResNet18 and
ResNet50. Compared to full inference-level duplication, the
ABED approach offers overheads that are lower by >4×.
The amount of protection offered by ABED for data storage
and movement is important for architectures that do not pro-
tect (with ECC/parity) storage and transportation structures
sufficiently against transient, intermittent, and permanent
errors. We show the levels of protection ABED techniques offer
for data movement in Figure 7. Since FIC technique protects the
input data to the original convolution kernel, it provides better
data storage and movement protection than the FC technique.
As the input fmap size increases, the coverage offered by the
FC technique reduces (compare FC FusedOCG results between
ResNet18-ImageNet and ResNet18-1080p). While the coverage
also reduces for the FIC technique, the reduction is much less.
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Fig. 13. The SDC FIT rate improvement with the FC and FIC techniques
without on-chip ECC.
Results show that FIC FusedIOCG offers highest data storage
and movement coverage among all the FIC options.
ECC/parity deployed in architectures used in HPC and
safety-critical systems provide no protection to computational
units, one of the major sources of intermittent and permanent
errors. ABED techniques provide very high protection
for computational units along with storage and data
transportation protection.
Error injections: We perform error injections into the input
and output tensors as described in Section 5.4. Our results
for the FC technique show that all single-bit injections into
non-zero filters and output fmaps are detected by the ABED
technique and no single-bit injections into input fmaps are
detected, as expected. A similar experiment for the FIC
technique shows that errors in the input fmaps, filters, and
output fmaps are detected.
Beam testing: To accurately quantify the vulnerability
improvement, we conducted accelerated-particle beam
experiments as outlined in Section 5.4. For the on-chip ECC
Off experiments, the results show a clear SDC FIT rate
reduction trend for the FC and FIC techniques. We observed
some SDCs when the FC technique was employed. Up
on inspecting the SDCs that were not detected by the FC
technique, we found the output to be corrupted such that the
values in original fmaps when reduced to be compared to the
checksums result in no error detection (both the original output
and checksum values were corrupted). Such manifestations
indicate corruption to the input fmap, which is not covered by
this technique. With on-chip SRAM (register file, L1/L2 cache)
ECC/parity protection enabled, the likelihood of such errors
will be low. We observed no SDCs while running convolutions
with the FIC technique. The ABED techniques detected a few
errors when no SDC was observed. These extra errors could
be the result of a fault in the verification kernel. Figure 13
shows the FIT rate improvement results with on-chip ECC Off.
With on-chip ECC On, we expect both the FC and FIC
techniques to offer high and comparable protection. Due to
the cost of experimentation and limited availability of the
beam time, we verify this only for FIC. In this experiment,
the FIC technique detected all observed SDCs. The error bars
for this experiment were relatively large, however, due to
limited beam time and relatively lower SDC rate of the GPU
(compared to on-chip ECC Off).
7 DISCUSSION: MANAGING ROUNDING ERROR
While commercial systems increasingly use fixed-point data
types during inference, the use of half-precision floating-point
data type (fp16) is also common. All the techniques described
in the paper are applicable to fp16 convolutions. Due to the
non-associative nature of floating-point operations, the final
comparison cannot be exact. We can test whether the two
reduced values computed through different ways are close
enough using a threshold. Corruptions can be detected if the
error changes the values such that the difference is greater than
the threshold. The lower the threshold, the higher the coverage.
The threshold depends on the rounding error introduced
by the ABED tasks (e.g., checksum generation) and baseline
convolution. We explored methods to significantly reduce the
error introduced by the ABED tasks. Since the filter checksums
are generated offline, very high precision operations can be
used to reduce rounding error. Most architectures support
accumulators that use higher precision compared to inputs
(e.g., fp32 accumulation for fp16 input is common). Leveraging
such hardware features, the error in input fmap online
checksum generation can be reduced. For the FC technique,
the resulting checksums are stored with the filters in fp16
format. The checksums can be stored as multiple fp16 values
(or filters) such that the error introduced by rounding to fp16 is
eliminated. For the FIC technique, the checksum can be stored
in a fp32 data type. The output verification step can also use a
higher-precision accumulator to reduce the rounding error. We
estimate the error introduced by the checksum generation and
verification steps (not shown here) and found it to be much
smaller than the average error introduced by the convolution.
Since the error introduced by the baseline convolution is
challenging to bound (due to the varying implementations,
algorithms, and input value distributions), we rely on
heuristics to estimate average rounding error. For some
uncommon input values, the observed error can be higher
than the threshold used for error detection, causing check
failures in fault-free runs (we call them false positives). The
system must recover from false positives to guarantee forward
progress. False positives can be handled using a combination
of techniques, if the rate is low: (1) rerun the layer on a
different component (CPU/GPU/DLA) by incurring higher
latency, or (2) notify a higher layer in the system to determine
whether the it can tolerate skipping the inference. A recent
study found that many low-level errors are tolerable at the
system-level [20]. If the false positive rate is high, a diagnostic
module can be invoked to tune the threshold or switch to the
low-throughput duplication mode.
8 CONCLUSIONS
CNNs have made their way into safety-critical and HPC
systems. GPU and accelerator-based systems are preferred
platforms for CNNs, with the convolution consuming most
of their execution time. Since safety is paramount for such
systems, it is important to ensure the correctness of con-
volutions in the presense of hardware errors. This paper
proposes an algorithm-based error detection (ABED) solution
for convolutions, providing a much lower overhead approach
compared to full duplication. We demonstrate how this solu-
tion can be employed during highly optimized CNN inference
executions that fuse multiple layers and use reduced-precision
operations. Results show that ABED eliminates convolution
output corruptions for all studied hardware errors with low (6-
23%) runtime overhead, at least 4× lower than full duplication.
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